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THE FOLKLORE OF INVESTOR CAPITALISM
John C. Coffee, Jr.*
How MONEY MANAGERS ARE CHANGING
TiE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA. By Michael Useem. New
York: BasicBooks. 1996. Pp. vii, 332. $30.
INVESTOR CAPITALISM:

Ideally, Thurman Arnold should review this book. In his The
Folklore of American Capitalism,' Arnold dissected the ideology
and rationalizations by which the business community of an earlier
day defended its legitimacy and perquisites. Michael Useem, a sociologist at the Wharton School, also has an interest in the ideology
of the business community: how corporate managers view the new
institutional investors, how they justify resistance, and the tensions
and inconsistencies between their critiques of money managers and
their own behavior. This is an underutilized perspective (which law
and economics inherently tends to overlook), and Useem is at his
best when he compares the rival lenses through 2which corporate
executives and money managers view each other.
Useem is, however, neither Thurman Arnold nor even the first
qualitative social scientist to focus on the relationship between
institutional investors and corporate executives. Preceding him
were William O'Barr and John M. Conley, cultural anthropologists
at Duke University and the University of North Carolina, respectively, who earlier in this decade published a significant and
ground-breaking work, which reported that the style of decisionmaking that they observed within pension funds was vastly different
from the stereotypes reported in the popular press.3 Based on field
work at nine large pension funds, these researchers found that
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. B.A. 1966,
Amherst; LL.B. 1969, Yale; LL.M. 1976, New York University. - Ed.
1. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, Tim FouayoRE OF AMERICAN CAPrrALISM (1937). Arnold
was, of course, attacking what he saw as the mythology of the market system and the tired
conceptualism that he believed underlay antitrust enforcement. In referencing Arnold, the
skeptic of business ideologies, I do not mean to imply agreement with his hostility to antitrust
enforcement.
2. Useem perceptively notes that "[a]t the core of the management culture is a rationale
for resisting certain investor demands." P. 78. He detects three central claims: (1) investors
have short time horizons; (2) investors lack the qualifications to speak on management issues;
and (3) money managers do not truly represent the ultimate owners of the enterprise. Pp.
78-103. His analysis of these claims is well done and admirably concise.
3. See Wni.AM M. O'BARR & JoH-N M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: Tim WEALTH
AND POWER OF INsTrrtUTONAL INVEsTiNG (1992); see also John M. Conley & William M.
O'Barr, The Culture of Capita. An AnthropologicalInvestigation of InstitutionalInvestment,
70 N.C. L. REv. 823 (1992).
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money managers were not aggressive, performance-oriented, or
preoccupied with short-term results, but rather were risk averse,
extremely desirous of avoiding personal responsibility for their
decisions, and generally eager to seek protection within the herd by
adopting investment management strategies, such as indexing, that
effectively minimized individual choice. 4 Surprisingly, the pension
fund managers that they studied gave highly personalized and idiosyncratic explanations for decisions that they had reached and seldom engaged in explicitly economic reasoning when asked to
defend their decisions or their investment strategies. 5 More to the
point, Conley and O'Barr's pension fund managers were extremely
reluctant to become involved in the corporate governance of their
portfolio companies. 6 Public fund managers, they did find, were
somewhat more prepared to be activists, but even these fund managers also pleaded time and informational constraints as a justification for their passivity.
Possibly because their findings were so counterintuitive, the
Conley and O'Barr study has encountered some sharp criticism,
chiefly on the grounds that its authors were economically naive and
brought much value-laden intellectual baggage with them. 7 Still,
given that they are Useem's immediate intellectual precursors, one
naturally looks to him to confirm or rebut Conley and O'Barr - or
at least to contrast his work with theirs.
Yet, Useem ignores Conley and O'Barr.8 This is especially surprising because both books were sponsored by the Institutional
Investor Project of the Center for Law and Economic Studies of
Columbia University. Although these two books thus sadly pass
each other like ships in the night, Useem does have a perspective
that contrasts sharply with that of Conley and O'Barr: subject to
only marginal qualifications, he buys eagerly into the proposition
4. To a considerable extent, they also describe the avoidance of personal responsibility as
often fostered by "the complexity and consequent impenetrability of the decisionmaking
structure" within the large pension fund. Conley & O'Barr, supra note 3, at 834-37.
5. In a classic, if unintended, oxymoron, Conley and O'Barr generalize that, based on
their observations, "[t]he work of Adam Smith's invisible hand was rarely in evidence." Id.
at 827. Of course, were it evident, Adam Smith would have called it the visible hand. In
fairness, Conley and O'Barr's point is that decisions seemed to be the product of "historical
quirks, seemingly petty personal disputes, and bruising political battles" - but not economic
criteria. Id. If public pension fund managers are more likely to be replaced as a result of
political decisions by state legislatures than as the result of poor economic performance (as
Conley and O'Barr also found), such behavior is exactly what economists would predict.
6. At least in the case of private pension funds, Conley and O'Barr find fund passivity to
be explained by a "version of the Golden Rule: Do unto other corporations as you would
want their pension funds to do unto yours." Id. at 842-43.
7. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Culture of Capitak Comments on Conley and O'Barr,71
N.C.L. REv.501 (1993).
8. I can find only one very modest reference to their study in Useem's footnotes. See p.
281 n.11. O'Barr and Conley are also listed in his references. P. 311.
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that corporate managers are effectively constrained by institutional
investors.
Different as their perspectives are, there is no necessary contradiction here. Their rival views may be partly explainable by the
different populations that they are studying. Despite his title,
Useem's real focus is on the corporate executives who now negotiate and interact with institutional money managers. To research
this book, he interviewed senior executives at some twenty large
public corporations (the identities of these corporations are kept
secret and code names are used, but some seem clearly identifiable). In common, each of these firms had experienced institutional
activism and was learning to cope with it. Useem's qualitative
approach to the interaction of money managers and corporate executives offers genuine insights - principally as to the tactics and
techniques by which senior corporate executives are learning to
"manage" these relationships. Still, this technique has its obvious
limitations. If one wants to understand fully the new institutional
investor, this methodology of interviewing primarily the executive
cadre of selected public corporations is roughly analogous to that of
studying divorced husbands by interviewing principally their exwives. One will predictably hear that ex-husbands are a disagreeable and abusive group, but this may be only half the story. As a
result, Useem inevitably tells much more about the thought
processes and world view of senior corporate executives than about
the money managers to which he refers in his title. This is not without value, but it makes his title a misnomer and also suggests who
the audience is that he principally wishes to reach.
Logically, the differing focuses of these authors also raise the
possibility that both studies could conceivably be right: that is,
money managers could have only weak incentives to monitor, but
corporate executives could feel threatened and therefore invest
heavily in "managing" this new relationship. This observation will
lead to some final remarks on which this review concludes.
One last prefatory observation: Useem brings an idiosyncratic
perspective to his analysis of money managers that may distort his
focus, in at least two respects. First, like many business school
professors, he is very much the academic entrepreneur. Correspondingly, his voice and perspective waver: sometimes he is the
disinterested scholar; other times, the street-smart, savvy practitioner. At its worst, this book occasionally reads like a how-to-do-it
manual on the care and feeding of institutional investors: how to
keep them docile and compliant.
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Second, as a former student of the civil rights movement and
grassroots community activism,9 Useem recurrently analogizes the
more aggressive public pension funds to the liberal and radical
activists who galvanized the 1960s civil rights movement and eventually mobilized the initially lethargic liberal wing of the American
middle class.' 0 But the administrators of public pension funds are
largely mid-level, underpaid public servants operating within state
bureaucracies and subject to a variety of political and logistical constraints. Whether they should be viewed as the intellectual catalysts
of this movement - in effect, the vanguard of the financial proletariat - seems doubtful. As later discussed, private money managers
may prefer to let the public funds lead the initial assault in any battle with corporate managers in order to minimize their own costs
and maintain their own financial camouflage. More generally,
while Useem conceptualizes institutional investors as an awakening
politicalmovement, the logic of their collective action may be more
determined by economic incentives than by political ideologies. In
any event, the role played by the public funds may resemble more
that of Don Quixote than that of Paul Revere: when they are supported by allies, they can win, but otherwise, they are tilting at
windmills and destined to lose. Seldom can they awaken a more
broadly based shareholder movement.
Useem's central thesis starts from the perception that we have
moved from an era of managerial capitalism to one of "investor
capitalism," in which institutional investors have substantially
reduced the agency costs in corporate governance. This is, of
course, the conventional wisdom. No one doubts that managements are much more constrained today by investor preferences
than in a prior era when corporate stock was largely held by individual shareholders. But what does it mean to say that the era of
investor capitalism has arrived? It sounds reassuring, even legiti9. See, &g., Gary T. Marx & Michael Useem, Majority Involvement in Minority
Movements: Civil Rights, Abolition, Untouchability, 27 J. Soc. Issuns 81 (1971).
10. P. 39. For example, Useem asserts that:
[t]he activist funds play a role akin to that of political leadership in social movements.
When a group of individuals or organizations faces distressed conditions, many may feel
aggrieved but few are called to challenge. Leadership typically falls on the shoulders of
a minority, a subgroup whose special conditions facilitate and inspire rebellion. Often
this small cadre is composed of those who are most secure in their status and least subject to reprisal .... At the core of the investor movement leadership is a small set of
public funds.
P. 54. Later, he adds, "Long-disenfranchised shareholders - or, more precisely, institutional
investors - are doing what community organizers urge dispossessed communities to do anywhere." P. 254. Not only is the utility of this analogy doubtful, but it may even be misapplied
within its own four corners. For example, public pension funds are subject to different forms
of reprisal from different sources than are private pension funds, but are neither secure nor
incentivized to act to the same degree as, for example, are mutual funds. The failure to
consider the incentive problem in public pension funds is one of the more glaring omissions
in this book.
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mizing. But just how constrained are managements and how far
can managements deviate from investor preferences (or the market's judgment) without incurring a shareholder revolt that ousts
them? Useem focuses very little on this question, because his preoccupation is with how to "manage" this relationship.
Yet, the possibility that the relationship can be "managed" suggests, at least to a cold-eyed reader, that the agent can manipulate
the principal. Useem in effect tells how, but not how much. Here,
the principal problems with this book are, first, that it focuses very
little on the costs of collective action by shareholders and, second, it
never examines the underlying forces that generated the current
structure of relationships between institutional investors and corporate managers or that may limit its future evolution. Nonetheless,
this is a factually rich book, and it is useful to consider the evidence
that it amasses, much of which points to conclusions that differ from
those that it offers.
I.

MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY TODAY: How CLOSE ARE
WE TO INVESTOR CAPITALISM?

Early in this book, Useem paints the following word picture of
CalPers, which he describes as the "premier activist shareholder"
(p. 181), and its chief executive, Dale Hanson, at a 1993 conference
between corporations and institutional investors:
When Calpers executives spoke, business listened. Their patience
might allow a troubled chief executive some breathing room. Their
impatience might bring the boot.... By midday... Calpers' commanding presence became evident even to the uninitiated. The chief
executive, Dale Hanson, was introduced at a ballroom luncheon as a
a dozen
man who required no introduction, and once he finished... 11
people pressed forward, pencils and notebooks at the ready.
This is, of course, exactly the sort of commentary that one reads
every day in business page journalism. But if reporters who need to
meet daily deadlines can be forgiven for always describing institutional investors as "powerful," investors as "skittish," and markets
as "volatile," more should be expected of scholars. Indeed, Useem
does know better. Elsewhere in this book, he notes some of the
reasons why organizationally CalPers is more likely to be a passive
than an active monitor: namely, it "employs only two inside managers to oversee its $20 billion internally managed indexed funds"
(p. 61). Given that it managed investments of over $68 billion in
1992 (p. 31), such obviously thin staffing must result in an overload
11. P. 39. I should point out that I was the person introducing Mr. Hanson at this luncheon as a person who needed "no introduction," and I have a decidedly different impression
as to what was occurring- namely, Mr. Hanson was being stroked by persons who wanted
future access.
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problem that disables any serious attempt at monitoring. Moreover, CalPers's ability to affect behavior at its portfolio companies
is further constrained by its adherence to the common policy among
institutional investors of limiting their individual holdings to a low
percentage (typically one to two percent) of the voting stock in any
individual company (p. 174). Indeed CalPers's portfolio is actually
smaller in terms of the number of stocks owned than that of its
leading peers. In 1991, Fidelity (the largest mutual fund family)
spread its holdings over 2300 firms; Aetna held stock in over 2400
firms; and CalPers's colleague, the California State Teachers Retirement System, owned over 3500 stocks, despite a portfolio one quarter the size of that of CalPers. 12 While not all institutional investors
manage portfolios of 500 or more stocks, the bulk of the total assets
under institutional management appears to be in the hands of those
that do (p. 177 fig. 6.1). Useem correctly implies that these portfolios are well beyond the institution's effective span of control.
What Useem misses, however, is that to the extent an institution
such as CalPers does opt to be "activist," its targets are still necessarily constrained by its logistical inability to engage in meaningful
individualized monitoring. Rather than push for divestitures, corporate restructurings, changes in management, or indirect board
representation (all of which usually produce stock gains), CalPers
tends to focus on "good government" issues, such as executive compensation, the elimination of staggered boards, or improved shareholder voting procedures. While critics have charged that CalPer's
preoccupation with "Mickey Mouse" reforms results in only symbolic victories and has not "produced significant stock gains in
targeted companies,"13 they ignore that this focus is necessitated by
the size of the portfolio held by CalPers. Once an institution's portfolio reaches a thousand or more stocks, only standardized, recurring issues (such as the desirability of a shareholder vote on poison
pills or the elimination of staggered boards) can be feasibly
addressed, because the merits of such an issue do not change with
the specific case.
Although many institutional investors do not follow CalPers's
policy of extreme diversification, those that do not tend to be disabled as monitors for entirely different reasons. Private pension
funds solve the logistical problems in monitoring by delegating
investment (and, to a slightly lesser extent, voting) decisions to
external money managers, who compete for the company's pension
business. Thus, a large corporation may at any time have a number
of outside pension managers handling its pension's assets, all in
12. Pp. 30, 176. The index fund managers (such as Wells Fargo) lead the pack with portfolios totaling over 4000 stocks.
13. Barry Rehfeld, Low.cal CaIPERS, INSTTunTIONAL NvEsTOR, Mar. 1997, at 41, 41.
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active competition with one another. This probably results in superior monitoring, but it creates a coordination problem; that is, different fund managers can and do vote differently on the same issue
and find it hard to cooperate when they are in competition for the
client's business. For all these reasons, even holding aside the confficts of interest that private money managers face because they are
dependent on corporate clients, it may be shortsighted to assume
that institutional investors are powerful simply because they are
large. This assumption mistakenly equates an ox with a bull.
If we switch from the investor's perspective to the corporation's,
this coordination problem comes into clearer focus. Exxon (to give
an example used by Useem) does not face a unified phalanx of
institutional investors, but a highly, dispersed coalition of some 700
institutional investors (p. 176). As Useem repetitively explains,
investor relations departments can manage such a field of dispersed
institutional shareholders and can usually quell dissatisfaction
before it foments into mutiny. Thus, the real measure of the potential for institutional activism is less the aggregate percentage of
stock held by institutions than the level of concentration within that
institutional ownership: In short, how much stock do the top ten or
twenty shareholders control? 14 Whereas in Great Britain the evidence is that this group often controls more than fifty percent of the
stock, the U.S. figure has been estimated at twenty-one percent.' 5
This percentage is significant because as a practical matter twenty
may be near the maximum feasible number of shareholders that a
single institution can contact under time-constrained circumstances.
Economists understand that collective action among a dispersed
coalition will be costly. Those institutions who lead the fight must
incur the often considerable expenses of proxy fights and litigation,
but they have little way of taxing the free riders who may benefit
from these expenses but do not wish to pay for them. Once we
recognize that corporate governance is a form of what economists
call a "public good," it is no surprise that investment in such a public good tends to be underfunded.' 6 From this perspective, then,
the fact that public pension funds are activists may imply less that
they are more sophisticated or the committed vanguard of a new
14. Useem does note that the top five shareholders at General Motors held only 6% of its
stock in 1990, whereas a similar number of German investors held 74% of Daimler-Benz's
stock. P. 174.
15. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the InstitutionalInvestor: A Half-Time Report,
15 CARDozo L. REv. 837, 852-53 (1994) (citing data on largest 25 U.S. corporations). Note,
however, that these twenty need not all be institutions or sympathetic to shareholder activism. Rather, this largest twenty could include the CEO or the founder's descendants, and
hence it constitutes a ceiling on, rather than a likely estimate of, institutional concentration.
16. This was the central insight in Mancur Olson's classic work on collective action
problems. See MANCUt OLSON, THE Looc OF CoLLEcrvE AcION: PUBLIc GOODS AND
Tim THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
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movement (as Useem tends to present them) than that they are
either economically naive or politically motivated (or both) in their
willingness to confer gratuitous benefits on the "private" institutional investors, who predictably accept these benefits but seldom
offer to share the costs.
Like Sherlock Holmes's dog that did not bark in the night, there
is something curiously missing from Useem's analysis (and also
from Conley and Barr's): at no point is there any discussion or reference to institutional investors acting in concert to influence corporate management. This omission is not the product of faulty
reporting; in fact, collective action by institutional investors is relatively rare. But why? To the extent institutions do not seek to
unite around specific actions or agendas, they are inherently easy to
"manage." "Divide and conquer" strategies have worked since well
before the advent of the modem corporate governance wars.
Alone, institutional investors will necessarily have somewhat idiosyncratic agendas, and each can be separately stroked and placated.
Moreover, given the earlier noted overload problem caused by
large portfolios and small staffs, institutional investors that do not
act in concert are restricted to symbolic politics - such as CalPers's
much publicized annual strategy of identifying a "dirty dozen" corporate managements with the worst governance records. 17 To be
sure, such a strategy works to a degree; a corporate management no
more wants to be on CalPers's list (thereby grouped with Archer
Daniels Midland and the other poster boys of poor corporate governance) than it wishes to be subject to a Mike Wallace-style expos6
on Sixty Minutes. In short, only through coalitions can institutional
investors maximize their political or economic clout.
So why do institutional investors not form coalitions? Hypotheses are easy. Legal restrictions, such as the William Act's overexpansive definition of "group," provide a partial explanation.' 8
Another cause is the fiduciary ideology that each institutional
investor, when asked this question, inevitably articulates: they are
responsible only to their own board and their own beneficiaries or
shareholders. True enough, but there are seldom conflicts between
the beneficiaries of the Wisconsin Investment Board and those of
CalPers. Over the last decade, CalPers and Wisconsin have probably been the two most activist public pension funds, but they rarely
17. I do not mean to disparage this strategy, which undoubtedly has great public relations
value. This year, CalPers's "home page" on the Internet identifies its worst corporate governance "underperformers." See John Wilcox, Electronic Communications and Proxy Voting:
The GovernanceImplications of Shareholdersin Cyberspace, INsIGMrs, March 1997, at 8.
18. See Coffee, supra note 15, at 877-82 (discussing the SEC's extension of Section 13(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934's definition of "group" to include any "voting group,"
despite absence of statutory language to support this extension).
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act inconcert.19 The New York State Common Retirement Fund
(the second largest after CalPers) is also notably aggressive and
outspoken, but it limits itself to "social issues. '20 The Florida
Board of Administration (the fourth largest public fund) is another
occasional activist, but it also seldom acts with allies, preferring to
"take it one case at a time." 21 In short, each fund prefers to play
"The Lone Ranger," with its own agenda and little willingness to
engage in common action.
Why? At the risk of stating a tautology, the answer has to be
that the incentives to take collective action do not exceed the costs
(both political and economic). Because a pension fund holding the
equity securities of a thousand or more issuers in its portfolio incurs
relatively little gain from any single victory over a corporate management (and may suffer some political and economic costs), it may
base its decisions about when to be an activist more on political,
rather than economic, grounds. But, if so, the process resembles
symbolic theater - much like student politics in the university.
Indeed, if we view public pension funds as fundamentally political
bodies, the problem with collective action is that it forces the individual fund, as a political body, to share credit with others. A strategy under which a public pension fund has a one-to-one
confrontation with a particular corporate management may be relatively ineffective as a lever for economic change, but it is great politics. In contrast, behind-the-scenes negotiations and compromise,
in which a group of funds are quietly represented by a common
agent, may be effective economics but poor politics. Credit shared
is credit diffused. Thus, the irony is that both corporate managements and public pension funds may prefer high profile face-offs to
quiet bargaining between a coalition of investors and an individual
corporate management. In this light, the possibility surfaces that
public pension funds are "managed" (using Useem's phrase) at
least in part because they like it that way.
But, if this seemingly cynical assessment has any validity - at
least with regard to public pension funds - how does one explain
the seeming evidence that institutional activism has had a marked
impact? For example, Useem points to the spate of CEO firings in
1992 and 1993 to demonstrate the potency of institutional activism,
but these firings may well have had a more basic cause: fierce international competition caused by the globalization of world markets.
19. See The Loneliness of the Shareholder Activis4 INSTrrtUnONAL INVESTOR, March
1997, at 46 (quoting general counsel of Wisconsin Investment Board as preferring a policy of
"[tialk softly and carry a big proxy"). Unfortunately, no single proxy is that big. Even a five
percent holder - as Wisconsin often is - cannot realistically threaten a credible proxy contest without allies.
20. Id. (quoting Carl McCal, the New York State Comptroller and sole trustee).
21. Id. (quoting Peter Collins, communications manager for the Florida fund).
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The firms that terminated their CEOs during this period - General
Motors, IBM, Eastman Kodak, American Express, and others had truly lost their way and were being outdistanced by their rivals.
To be sure, institutions may have increased the pressure and hastened these executive transitions, but, to paraphrase Samuel
Johnson, the prospect of extinction does wonders to focus the mind
of the corporate board (even at the most hidebound corporate
dinosaurs). In these cases, all affected corporate constituencies creditors, suppliers, employees, and even lower management could see the need for change, and in any event the ultimate decisionmaker was the board of directors, which no doubt heard the
voices of institutional shareholders, but only as part of the general
clamor for change.
Even if the increased turnover in CEOs is seen as an indication
-of enhanced stockholder power (and it may be in part), this evidence must be balanced against the contrary and more objective
evidence that management has become steadily more entrenched in
recent years. Here, Useem ably develops much of the available evidence. First, antitakeover devices have become more, not less,
prevalent. Between 1989 and 1992, Useem notes, the fraction of
the top 1000 U.S. corporations with staggered boards rose and a
majority of such firms now have staggered boards - which deny
stockholders the power to unseat the incumbent board in a single
election.22 Only nine percent of such firms have adopted a confidential voting policy under which management does not learn how
institutional shareholders voted their proxies (p. 160). If institutions held the dominant position that Useem attributes to them,
one of their first acts logically would be to assure themselves of the
same confidentiality that the ordinary citizen has when voting in a
municipal election. In fact, institutions have tried to secure confidential voting and other governance reforms, but with only modest
success. 23
The poison pill supplies another example. Of the 1000 largest
market-value companies, 495 had adopted a pill in 1989 and 643 in
1992 (p. 64) - an approximately thirty percent rise over only a
three-year period and precisely during the time period in which
institutions were becoming more vocal. Although the impact and
legitimacy of the poison pill can be debated at considerable length,
the fact remains that institutions have long opposed its adoption

22. P. 160 (noting rise from 55% to 59% between 1989 and 1992).
23. Georgeson & Co., a major proxy soliciting firm, estimates that some 100 corporate
governance proposals from shareholders were voted on during 1995, but only seven succeeded. See Paul Sweeney, Clash By Proxy: Organized Labor and ShareholderActivism,
AcRoss Tm BoARD, May 1996, at 21.
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without a shareholder vote (and have been notably unsuccessful in
so doing).
Next, as Useem clearly documents, the idea of institutional representation on the corporate board remains anathema to most corporate managements.24 Looking at the composition of corporate
boards, a cynic thus might conclude that it remains the government
of the managers, by the managers, and for the managers. To be
sure, this overstates, but neither the idea of professional directors
nor that of shareholder-nominated board members has gained even
a toehold level of acceptance. Even neutral "good government"
reforms remain very unpopular. For example, a recent survey of
more than 800 firms by the American Society of Corporate Secretaries found that: (1) more than 81% of respondents rejected limitations on multiple board memberships for directors; (2) 79.9%
opposed creating shareholder advisory committees; (3) 79%
opposed designating a "lead" outside director; (4) 76.6% rejected
term limits for directors; (5) 73.6% opposed allowing directors to
meet with investors or other stakeholders; and (6) 62.9% disfavored
a policy whereby the outside directors would hold periodic meetings without the CEO or other managers being present.25 The
desirability of each of these reforms can again be debated, but the
uniformity of corporate resistance to them suggests that constructive engagement between institutional investors and corporate
executives is not yet fully at hand.
Indeed, from a legal perspective, it is not even clear that recent
deregulatory initiatives by the SEC have significantly empowered
institutional investors. Although the SEC did partially deregulate
the proxy rules in 1992 (but still left substantial obstacles under the
Williams Act to trip up institutional investors who arguably form a
voting group),2 6 developments at the state level have been largely
adverse. The "Just Say No" defense has now been accepted in
Delaware;27 most states have enacted antitakeover statutes (and
some of these statutes chill voting contests as well as tender offers);
and proposed state legislation threatens further limits on shareholder rights. For example, the ability of shareholders to call a spe24. Pp. 223-27. In fact, only one in ten of the CEOs of 322 large companies participating
in a 1993 survey indicated that (at least in principle) an institutional representative would be
welcome on their board. P. 227. Useem does not discuss the many reasons (some compelling) why institutions do not seek board representation (in particular, federal securities law
problems). This omission reflects the relatively one-sided nature of his inquiry into the executive perspective (but not the money manager's).
25. See The IRRC Monitor: Board Practices Survey, CoRP. GovERNANcE ADvISOR,
May/June 1996, at 25, 25-26.
26. For a review of the SEC's inconsistent record, see Coffee, supra note 15. Professor
Useem has little specific to say about any of these legal developments.
27. See, eg., Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1554-64
(D. Del. 1995); Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372 (Del. 1995).
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cial meeting of shareholders would be significantly disfavored by
recent legislation proposed by the American Bar Association's
Committee on Corporate Laws.28
In retrospect, it is now clear that the takeover wars of the 1980s
are over. More importantly, management won. To be sure, hostile
corporate control contests between large entities will persist, but
the true insurgent of the 1980s, the financial entrepreneur (for
example, Boone Pickens or Carl Icahn) who could launch a "bustup" takeover with junk bonds, has now disappeared from the scene.
Why, then, should we expect that, in the institutional wars of the
1990s, management is any less likely to prevail again? To ask this
question is not to answer it. If ever there was an unlovable champion of shareholder welfare or economic efficiency, it was the
1980s-style takeover raider. To the public at large, the activities of
the bust-up takeover raider seemed designed to do nothing more
than enrich themselves and make a quick buck at the expense of
employees, creditors, local communities, and long-term growth.
Whether or not accurate, this perception made these takeover
entrepreneurs highly vulnerable to antitakeover legislation and may
have encouraged courts to uphold novel defensive tactics, such as
the poison pill. In contrast, the institutional investor as activist is
subject to none of these political liabilities. As the primary repository of the middle class's retirement savings, pension and mutual
funds are the public writ large.
But while the institutional investor is a more credible opponent
for management on the political level, it may be a far weaker economic antagonist. Fragmented among tens of thousands of pension
and mutual funds, and lacking the lobbying resources of corporate
managements, institutional investors are anything but an efficiently
organized political or economic force. Coordination among them
remains largely ad hoc and crisis-driven.
II.

ROOT CAusEs: THE PossmLE EXPLANATIONS FOR
INSTITUTIONAL IMPOTENCE

Useem clearly recognizes that institutional investors have large
portfolios and limited attention spans, and hence make relatively
ineffective monitors - except in the uncommon cases when they
are outraged by high-proffle incidents of corporate misfeasance and
nonfeasance. But he stops here with these observations that only
begin the analysis. Compared with institutional investors, corporate managements are just as overloaded with information, deci28. Under this pending revision to the Model Business Corporation Act, the shareholder
vote necessary to call a special meeting of shareholders would be raised from 10% to 25%.
See The IRRC Monitor: Shareholders'Rights to Call Special Meetings, Co". GoVEANC
ADVIsoR, May/June 1996, at 22.
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sions, and day-to-day crises and have no more time for lobbying
battles in Congress or the states on issues that are only of marginal
importance to them as individual companies. As a result, trade
associations long ago developed (for example, the Business Roundtable, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of
Commerce) to assert vigorously business's collective interest and
effectively economize on the costs of collective action by taxing the
would-be free riders. In the case of institutional investors, there is
really only one such group, the Council of Institutional Investors,
and Useem devotes virtually no attention to it.29 Yet, in principle,
this organization of some 100 members could coordinate the activities of institutional investors holding over $800 billion in assets (p.
65). More importantly, as the collective voice of many institutions,
it is less subject to threats of retaliation or loss of business than is
any individual institution. 30 Still, although the Council has at times
targeted particular companies and published lists of underachieving
firms whose corporate governance structure it deplores, it has never
sought to be the active lobbying or fundraising vehicle that, for
example, the Business Roundtable is.
Why not? This is precisely the type of question on which social
scientists must focus in order to explore the potential of institutional activism. In fact, Useem gives it no attention. Possibly, the
answer is that the community of institutional investors is too
divided between its public and private sectors for the Council (or
any similar body) to play a significant political or organizational
role paralleling that of the Business Roundtable (or even that of
environmental groups, such as the Sierra Club, which certainly
coordinate even more dispersed environmentalists). 31 Alternatively, the seeming inability of institutional investors to achieve a
critical mass on the political scene illustrates Mancur Olson's arguments about which "latent groups" can organize effectively and
which cannot.32 Because corporate managers are likely to incur
29. The index to Investor Capitalism shows only two references to the Council of
Institutional Investors; both are very brief. P. 325.
30. See Bernard S. Black, Agents WatchingAgents: The Promise of InstitutionalInvestor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1992).
31. In 1996, in a closely contested election, the Council's membership elected for the first
time a corporate executive to one of the Council's three co-chairs. See The IRRC Monitor:
Election at Council of InstitutionalInvestors,CoR'. GovERNANcE ADvisoR, May/June 1996,
at 26. The election appears to have been heatedly contested by union pension officials. The
result is that the three co-chairs of the Council are the New York City Comptroller, a Teamsters official, and the executive vice president of TRW - a triumvirate not likely to share a
common perspective or world view on many issues.
32. See OLsoN, supranote 16. Olson notes that when an action affects a large number of
persons, the effect on any individual may be so small that it is less than the costs of joining in
collective action. Id. at 43-52. Members of large groups may therefore have little incentive
to organize effectively. In contrast, smaller interest groups in which the individual members
have larger stakes are more likely to be effective. Id. at 125-28.
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individual losses from institutional activism that are greater than
the individual gains to shareholders, corporate managers may have
greater incentives to take collective action, even though their aggregate losses are small in comparison to the aggregate gains to shareholders. In any event, managers have a critical transaction cost
advantage, because they alone can expend corporate funds (while
shareholders spend their own).
This issue of coordination costs is central and may in turn
depend principally on the level of institutional concentration within
the market. Although the U.S. equity market is heavily "institutionalized," with the current level of institutional ownership estimated at fifty percent or more, it is not heavily concentrated (that
is, there are thousands of pension and mutual funds and no single
institution plays a predominating role as the flagship for others). In
contrast, the level of institutional activism appears to be higher in
Great Britain than in the United States. 33 This could be the result
of a variety of factors (including the higher level of institutional
ownership of equity securities in Great Britain - close to sixty-five
percent). 34 But the most striking difference between the U.S. and
the U.K. markets may be the level of concentration in institutional
ownership. In Great Britain, a relative handful of money managers
dominate the market, and one firm (Prudential) is generally
regarded as the standard bearer for the industry. This contrast
between the U.K. market structure in which fifty-odd institutions
(all in regular contact and generally having offices in close proximity within the financial district of London) control the bulk of the
equity under institutional management versus the far more dispersed and dynamically expanding U.S. marketplace may go far to
explain why a differential in coordination costs exists and why relatively greater institutional activism characterizes the British market.
The strange, but symptomatic, fact about the U.S. capital markets is
that we today have more mutual funds than publicly held
companies.
Another aspect of this difference may shed even more light on
why the level of institutional activism differs between the U.S. and
the U.K. markets - and, in turn, may have predictive value for the
prospect for greater activism by U.S. institutional investors. Inherently, a more concentrated market is also one with less liquidity.
As a result, large investors cannot exit costlessly when they are dissatisfied with a particular management's performance. 35 Rather,
33. See Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor
Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 1997, 2034-41 (1994).

34. See id. at 2002.
35. For a discussion of the special problems that exist in the U.K. market, see id at 2040-
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they are locked in - at least in the relative sense that the sale of a
large block will come at a greater discount in a less liquid market.
In turn, to the extent that investors find exit costly, they must turn
to the alternative remedy of "voice" - and become more active
shareholders.3 6 Thus, institutional investors may be more active in
the United Kingdom than in the United States because they have
less ability to liquidate their blocks in the market without incurring
a market penalty.
Although Useem makes little effort to survey the performance
of institutional investors in other economic systems (other than for
the standard cursory reference to Japan), he does supply some
anecdotal evidence that supports this interpretation that liquidity
concerns affect activism. The largest public pension funds and some
mutual funds have recognized, he reports, that they cannot exit
costlessly by selling into the market because their holdings in individual companies are too large.37 Exit being thus less available,
voice is becoming more attractive. Such data represent, however,
an economic, rather than his preferred sociological, explanation for
why the largest public pension funds are more activist than many
private sector institutional investors. In short, the simplest explanation may be neither that public pension activists are culturally different nor an enlightened vanguard, but that, as investors who are
highly indexed, they are both exposed to greater losses and do not
wish to sacrifice the advantages of diversification through indexing
by exiting. Being far more stable, buy-and-hold investors than the
mutual funds (whose annual turnover often exceeds fifty percent),
they must exercise voice within a community that they cannot easily
escape.
This analysis that institutions exercise voice to the extent that
they have grown too large to engage in stock picking or quick, inand-out market maneuvers raises in turn a larger, deeper question
that Useem also largely overlooks: Instead of holding 1% to 3%
blocks in companies, institutional investors could seek real influence by holding more concentrated blocks of, say, 5% to 10%.
Why don't they? 38 Such a policy would give them greater influence
(although not true control), and it would not sacrifice the advantages of diversification. After all, full diversification is possible
based on holding far less than the several thousand stocks that
36. This is the classic tradeoff first articulated by Albert Hirschman. See ALBERT 0.
HmscHMAN,Exrr, VOICE ArD LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES 3-5 (1970).

37. Pp. 30-31 (citing officials at CREF, CalPers, and the California State Teachers
Retirement System).
38. A very few do. The best example is the Wisconsin Investment Board, which frequently holds 5% to 10% stakes in smaller companies. See The Loneliness of the Shareholder

Activist, supra note 19.
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some institutional investors today hold.3 9 Similarly, if institutions
are already locked in and hold blocks too large to easily liquidate at
even the 1% to 2% ownership level, why do they not invest more in
corporate governance activities, instead of continuing to limit themselves to very small internal staffs?
The seeming paradox is that institutions today have reached the
boundary where their individual holdings are too large to assure
them exit, but too small to give them effective voice. In this "no
man's land" between exit and voice, they face the worst of both
worlds. Yet, investors who acquire larger stakes without seeking to
seize control from management - for example, Warren Buffett or
Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts - have done extremely well. Usually,
success breeds imitation, but here it has not.
There are at least two major theories that attempt to answer this
paradox, both of which Useem ignores. First, my colleague, Mark
Roe, has argued that shareholder passivity was politically imposed
on institutional investors by legislation, as corporate managers
manipulated the regulatory system to protect their positions by constraining financial intermediaries. 40 From this perspective, the separation of ownership and control was never inevitable (as Berle and
Means contended it was41), because, but for governmental interference, financial intermediaries would have assumed the same monitoring role in the U.S. capital markets that they have in Germany
and Japan.
The rival perspective doubts that legal restraints are primarily
responsible for shareholder passivity and similarly is skeptical of
this claim that financial intermediaries would have evolved in the
direction of the Japanese main bank or the German universal bank
in the absence of politically imposed constraints intended to minimize their power.42 As one of the skeptics associated with this latter view, I have posited elsewhere that there exists a liquidity/
control tradeoff: the cost of high liquidity is weak voice, and the
cost of a strong voice is low liquidity. Given this tradeoff, it does
not follow that financial intermediaries that originate in a economy
characterized by liquid markets (such as the United States and the
United Kingdom) would naturally evolve into financial institutions
39. See Meir Statman, How Many Stocks Make a Diversified Portfolio, 22 J. FIN. &
353, 353-62 (1987).
40. See MARK J. ROE, STRoNo MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THM PoLmCAL RooTs OF
AMEmCAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); see also Mark J. Roe, A PoliticalTheory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 10 (1991); Black, supra note 30; Joseph A.
Grundfest, Subordinationof American Capital,27 J. FIN. EcoN. 89 (1990).
41. See ADoLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MoDERN CORPORATION
QUANTrATnVE ANALYSIS

AND PRIvATE PRoPERTY (1933).

42. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Controk The Institutional Investor as
CorporateMonitor, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1991); see also Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of InstitutionalShareholder Activism, 79 GEO. LJ. 445 (1991).
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(such as the Japanese main bank or the German universal bank)
that hold substantial power over their portfolio companies but that
enjoy relatively little liquidity. The assertion here is not that liquidity is better than control, or vise versa, but that the world is path
dependent. Institutions that evolve at one end of the liquidity/control continuum are not likely to move to the other end, absent
strong destabilizing pressures or other exogenous developments.
Instead, there is a trajectory to the evolution of economic institu43
tions that is largely determined by their initial starting position.
Of course, neither of these two views is necessarily inconsistent
with the other, and both can partially account for shareholder passivity among institutional shareholders. Deregulation might make
institutions more inclined to participate in corporate governance,
even it if could not induce them to hold large illiquid stakes. Had
Useem written from the perspective of one familiar with this
debate, he might have made a more useful contribution. For example, to what degree are money managers willing to consider proxy
contests or to finance other forms of joint action now that there has
been some deregulation under the proxy rules? What limits do
they place on their holdings in individual companies and why (that
is, legal barriers or liquidity concerns)? Regrettably, these are not
topics that he addresses.

III. TiE FuTuRE

EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONAL AcTIvisM

What will be the future course of investor-manager relations?
Useem is uncertain as to whether more disruption or a new equilibrium lies ahead. 44 In his view, it all "depends considerably upon
how well money managers and corporate managers work together
in constructing their new world" (p. 275). Although caution in predicting the future is always prudent, this emphasis on how money
managers and executives work and play together in the corporate
sandbox illustrates the limitations (harsher critics would say the
bankruptcy) of the sociological approach. Deeper forces and influences must be considered.
The future is undoubtedly contingent, but it is contingent on factors that can to a considerable extent be specified. Among these
factors are the following:
1. Will New Institutional Catalysts Emerge? More than on any
other single factor, the future of institutional activism hinges on
coalition formation. Lone Rangers must learn to join the team.
Yet, it is also clear that institutions are distrustful of long-term
43. See generally RIcRARD R. NELsO N & StoNEY G. WNTER, AN EVOLUTrONARY TBORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982).

44. P. 275 ("Whether the future is one of further expansion, a new equilibrium, or a
reversal of this trend remains to be seen.").
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political alliances (probably for good reason) and will not delegate
power outside their organization, except on a very short-term, specific basis. Thus, potential bridging organizations, such as the
Council of Institutional Investors, have remained weak by design.
But can other institutions evolve to fill such a specific, coalitionbuilding role on a case-by-case basis? Some logical candidates for
this brokering role already exist. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. ("ISS") and the Investor Responsibility
Research Center ("IRRC") are advisory firms that provide voting
advice. 45 Because the same advice is given to most institutions, this
can easily tend to build a "virtual coalition." But proxy advisory
firms do not themselves start proxy contests or put issues on the
corporation's agenda. Here, the more significant prototype may be
a firm like LENS, an investment advisor that specifically targets
underperforming firms and then seeks to improve their management through activist interventions. 46 This approach has promise,
but encounters cultural resistance within the institutional investor
community. Their success (or lack thereof) may thus prove to be
the best measure of the maturity of institutional activism as an economic movement.
2. Will the Institutionalizationof the Market Increase or Wane?
The growth of institutional investors has been fueled by
demographics: retirement savings have flooded into pension and
mutual funds, expanding them like accordions, as the baby boom
generation of the 1950s has begun to near retirement age. Predictably, this dynamic will reverse itself in due course, as the smaller
population in the next generation pumps less funds into these same
financial institutions. This factor could be offset if small investors
learn to prefer mutual funds to self-investing, but the net balance is
cloudy.
3. Will New Types of Institutional Investors or Retirement
Savings Vehicles Appear? The future of the pension fund is not
assured. Corporations may shift to 401(k) savings plans, 47 thereby
avoiding risks and costs to themselves (including potential liability
for underfunding), while shifting risk to the individual employee. A
by-product of this transition could be shrinkage of the traditional
pension plan and a resurgence in individual shareholdings through
401(k) plans. Again, the net impact on institutionalization is uncer45. For a brief discussion of proxy advisory firms, see Coffee, supranote 42, at 1354 n.301,
1358 n.314.
46. LENS was founded by Robert Monks and Nell Minow, two of the best known shareholder activists. See Joseph Grundfest, Just Vote No: A MinimalistStrategy for Dealing With
BarbariansInside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REv. 857, 903 (1993) (describing Monks and
Minow's approach).
47. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (1994).
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tain, because many of these assets may move to the effective control of the major mutual fund families that manage 401(k) plans.
Overshadowing even this uncertainty is the possible privatization of Social Security. If the assets of Social Security are even partially invested in the stock market, a new type of institutional
investor could emerge; possibly, even the federal government could
emerge to assume a role and stance equivalent to that of a state
public pension fund.
4. Can CoordinationCosts be Reduced? The logic of collective
action suggests that the development of more formalized networks
among institutional investors represents the most efficient way to
economize on the transaction costs of corporate governance. But
the slow progress to date on this score suggests that the different
categories of institutional investors do not really want to agree on
much. Little wonder. Union pension plans, corporate pension
plans, and day-trading mutual funds share little in common. Nonetheless, the most logical scenario is for the development of umbrella
groups that do not attempt to be so comprehensive or inclusive as
to wind-up being stalemated.
5. Will a Stock Price "Correction" Change Institutional Behavior? Since the more aggressive confrontations of 1992 and 1993,
there has been a recent relative honeymoon between institutions
and managements. Again, this is no surprise, because the stock
market has soared to record, stratospheric levels. If what went up
comes down, however, institutions may themselves face unprecedented pressures, particularly in the case of mutual funds where
shareholders can exit quickly (if not costlessly).
Ultimately, the future seems as unpredictable to me as it does to
Useem. In contrast to him, however, I am certain that it cannot be
shaped or determined by investor relations departments staffed by
human relations specialists. To focus on the process (as he does)
may be useful (and at times he is highly perceptive), but to confuse
process for substance is a fundamental flaw. As a result, this book
marks the boundary between where good journalism ends and
acceptable scholarship begins.
Looking beyond this particular book, I cannot resist the temptation to comment on the future of qualitative social science as
applied to corporate governance studies. The field is indeed open,
and the prospect for significant research is bright. The best candidates for this research are probably more like Useem than Conley
and O'Barr, who only too recently exchanged their pith helmets for
Brooks Brothers suits (the tribal costumes of their intended
quarry). In contrast, Useem is well versed in the economic knowledge that members of the corporate culture assume others know.
But the more basic problem is that the most interesting research
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lies at the seam where two distinct subcultures meet: the bureaucratic world of public pension funds and the free enterprise culture
of the large public corporation. Perhaps in the past, anthropologists
contented themselves with studying one tribe or one culture (at
least one at a time). Nonetheless, what is most interesting in this
arena is the interaction between conflicting cultures. Neither
Useem nor Conley and O'Barr have focused on this area where the
different cultures collide. Nonetheless, this is where the action is.

